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Abnormal Returns from Takeover Prediction 
Modelling: Challenges and Suggested Investment 
Strategies 
  
Abstract 
While takeover targets earn significant abnormal returns, studies tend to find no abnormal 
returns from investing in predicted takeover targets. In this study, we show that the difficulty 
of correctly identifying targets ex ante does not fully explain the below-expected returns to 
target portfolios. Target prediction models’ inability to optimally time impending takeovers, by 
taking account of pre-bid target underperformance and the anticipation of potential targets by 
other market participants, diminishes but does not eliminate the potential profitability of 
investing in predicted targets. Importantly, we find that target portfolios are predisposed to 
underperform, as targets and distressed firms share common firm characteristics, resulting in 
the misclassification of a disproportionately high number of distressed firms as potential targets. 
We show that this problem can be mitigated, and significant risk-adjusted returns can be earned, 
by screening firms in target portfolios for size, leverage and liquidity. 
 
       
JEL Classification: G11, G12, G14, G34 
Keywords: Takeover prediction, abnormal returns, portfolio strategies, investment timing, firm 
size, rumours
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1. Introduction 
A large number of studies show that takeover targets experience significant stock price 
increases around merger announcements. Jensen and Ruback (1983), one of the first systematic 
reviews of the mergers & acquisitions (M&A) literature, reports weighted average abnormal 
returns of 29.1 percent for US targets in the month or two surrounding an offer. A comparative 
study by Franks and Harris (1989) based on UK data reports abnormal returns of a similar 
magnitude. More recent studies employing US, UK and EU samples (e.g., Georgen and 
Renneboog, 2004; Danbolt, 2004; Gregory and O’Donohoe, 2014) show comparable abnormal 
returns to targets, ranging from 19.5 to 31 percent in the days and months surrounding a bid.  
Unsurprisingly, a number of studies (e.g., Palepu, 1986; Powell, 2001; Brar et al., 2009) 
explore whether a successful investment strategy can be developed by predicting potential 
targets. However, these studies report limited success despite finding that prediction models 
are fairly successful in identifying future targets. Powell (2001), for example, finds that the 
market- and size-adjusted returns to his UK target portfolio between 1st January 1996 and 31st 
December 1996 were -11.0 and -4.0 percent, respectively. Mirroring the conclusions of earlier 
studies, such as Palepu (1986) and Barnes (1999), Powell (2001, p. 1008) contends that 
‘developing statistical models to predict takeover targets is unlikely to result in a profitable 
investment strategy’. However, a small number of recent studies have reported that the 
generation of abnormal stock returns from takeover prediction is feasible. Using a small sample 
of Australian listed firms, Rodrigues and Stevenson (2013), for example, find that their model 
performs in line with the market in 2009, but outperforms the market in 2010 and 2011 when 
simple market-adjusted returns are considered. Their results are, however, only adjusted for 
risk using a simple market-adjusted returns model. To our knowledge, the most optimistic 
results have been reported by Brar et al. (2009). Their study, based on an EU sample, shows 
that a ‘takeover timing portfolio’ generates a modest alpha of 0.58 percent per month between 
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1995 and 2003 (Brar et al., 2009, p. 448). As discussed below, one potential reason for the 
gains reported by Brar et al. (2009) is the size restriction they impose by focusing on deals 
involving targets with market capitalisation in excess of $100 million. 
Our paper is motivated by the finding that target prediction models have some 
predictive ability (at least, better than random classification); targets gain substantially from 
takeover activity, yet portfolios of predicted targets fail to outperform the market. We 
contribute to the literature in two broad areas. First, we explore the underlying factors that 
influence the stock returns of predicted target portfolios. Amongst these are issues of poor 
timing, prediction errors and the tendency for distressed firms to be identified as potential 
targets. Second, we investigate potential strategies for mitigating the effects of these factors.  
In particular, we show that by screening firms in target portfolios for size, leverage and 
liquidity, the effect of distressed firms can be reduced and significant abnormal returns can be 
generated from the investment strategy. 
With respect to the factors influencing target portfolio stock returns, we highlight three 
potential reasons why portfolios generated from takeover prediction models fail to generate 
abnormal returns, and we investigate these by developing nine testable hypotheses. First, we 
examine the predictive ability of current prediction models and whether the prediction models’ 
inability to correctly predict a substantial number of future targets explains the low returns to 
target portfolios (as suggested by Palepu, 1986; Barnes, 1999; Powell, 2001, 2004; Cahan et 
al., 2011). Prediction models underperform if the predicted targets (or firms with high takeover 
likelihood) do not eventually receive takeover bids. Prior studies suggest that these firms 
(described as type II errors) are strategically better off if acquired. Given that takeover targets 
generally underperform prior to takeovers (Palepu, 1986; Powell, 2001), the expectation is that 
such firms are likely to continue to underperform unless they become a takeover target. The 
presence of type II errors in the portfolio of predicted targets will, perhaps, explain a substantial 
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portion of the low returns to these portfolios. We hypothesise that (i) type II errors 
underperform the typical non-target (hypothesis 1); and (ii) target portfolios stripped of type II 
errors earn significant abnormal returns (hypothesis 2). If the presence of type II errors explains 
the low returns to target portfolios, then the literature will benefit from the development of 
better prediction models.  
Second, we explore the challenge of optimal timing in target prediction, and whether 
poor timing in prediction potentially explains the low returns to target portfolios. The challenge 
arises from the finding that targets tend to perform poorly over several months prior to the bid 
announcement, but start to generate significant returns as the announcement date draws closer 
(we confirm this later in our study). This suggests that holding targets later rather than sooner 
might be of some benefit. Nonetheless, other market participants are likely to anticipate 
potential takeover bids as the bid date draws near, thus reducing any abnormal returns to be 
generated from the strategy. To our knowledge, our study is the first to consider the significance 
of timing when predicting takeover targets. 
To elaborate, optimal timing is hampered, as target prediction models employ firm 
fundamental values; therefore, annual portfolio rebalancing is used in takeover prediction 
modelling (see, for example, Palepu, 1986; Barnes, 1999; Powell, 2001; Powell and Yawson, 
2007; Cremers et al., 2009; Brar et al., 2009). However, the predictions may be may be made 
so early that the stock returns of targets experience a significant decrease before the pre-bid 
upward movement in stock price commences. We might, therefore, find very low returns to 
correctly predicted targets. Further, takeover prediction models exist in the public domain, and 
other market participants are likely to employ similar strategies. We should, therefore, expect 
to find evidence of market anticipation of predicted targets. We hypothesise that the returns to 
actual targets in target portfolios are low, as several potential targets are included in the 
portfolio either too early or too late (hypothesis 3). To directly test the effect of anticipation by 
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other market participants using similar models, we also hypothesise that takeover targets which 
are correctly predicted by our model are less of a surprise to the market, and, hence, earn 
significantly lower abnormal returns than targets which we are unable to predict (hypothesis 
4).  
Third, we explore whether target characteristics that match those of firms that are 
predisposed to experience financial distress explain the difficulty of generating abnormal stock 
returns from target prediction models. Prior research (e.g., Pastena and Ruland, 1986; Clark 
and Ofek, 2004; Powell and Yawson, 2007) suggests that targets and bankrupt firms share 
similar characteristics, and, therefore, mergers and bankruptcy are alternative forms of 
reorganisation facing firms in distress. Targets and distressed (bankrupt) firms tend to be small 
firms with poor stock performance (Powell and Yawson, 2007). Takeover prediction models 
are therefore likely to select as potential targets firms that are simultaneously classified as 
candidates for bankruptcy. Prior takeover prediction studies (e.g., Palepu, 1986; Powell, 2001; 
Brar et al., 2009) ignore the impact of this tendency and hence overstate portfolio returns by 
not recognising the significant loss occurring when predicted targets exit the portfolio through 
bankruptcy.  
To our knowledge, our study is the first to consider the impact of bankruptcies on the 
profitability of investing in predicted takeover targets and to propose a strategy for mitigating 
its effect. We can directly address the issue of investing in firms that eventually go bankrupt 
by explicitly trying to identify these firms ex ante and excluding them from our target portfolio. 
We adopt an existing bankruptcy prediction model – the Taffler Z score model (Taffler, 1983) 
– to help us identify and eliminate potential candidates for bankruptcy prior to portfolio 
formation. The empirical evidence suggests bankruptcy prediction models identify firms in 
distress with a considerable level of error (Agarwal and Taffler, 2008) and hence, should be 
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used with some caution. Still, we hypothesise that stock returns are stronger when firms with 
low Taffler Z scores are excluded from target portfolios (hypothesis 5).   
 Our second solution to the distress problem builds on research findings that merging 
firms are larger and less leveraged than their counterparts which reorganise through 
bankruptcies (Pastena and Ruland, 1986). By using market capitalisation as a noisy (yet 
efficient) proxy to identify candidates for bankruptcy, we can mitigate its effect on our portfolio 
returns by reducing our net investment in firms that might potentially go bankrupt. We 
hypothesise that stock returns are stronger when excluding small capitalisation firms that are 
more likely to become insolvent (hypothesis 6). We can explore this by screening our portfolios 
for small firms.  
Nonetheless, prior research also suggests that the largest firms tend to be shielded from 
acquisition (Palepu, 1986). This implies that if the size cut-off in our screen is set so as to invest 
only in very large companies, we might avoid investing in most firms that eventually go 
bankrupt, but we will also be unlikely to invest in many firms that eventually receive takeover 
bids. We test this empirically by hypothesising that stock returns are weaker when investing 
only in large capitalisation firms that are less likely to become targets (hypothesis 7). Jointly, 
hypotheses 5 and 6 suggest that there is a benefit (avoid firms that go bankrupt) and a drawback 
(less likely to invest in takeover targets) to investing in larger firms only. This would suggest 
that the traditional value-weighting strategy for portfolio formation might not address this 
problem, as it gives less weight to small firms, which may be more likely to suffer financial 
distress, but more weight to firms which are unlikely to be actual targets (hypothesis 8).  
Alternatively, we explore whether other bankruptcy indicators, including measures of 
the degree of firm leverage and firm liquidity, can be more effective in screening target 
portfolios for firms in financial distress. Prior research (e.g., Taffler, 1983; Pastena and Ruland, 
1986; Agarwal and Taffler, 2008; Powell and Yawson, 2007) suggests that bankrupt firms are 
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characterised by low liquidity and high leverage. Hence, we hypothesise that stock returns are 
stronger when firms with high leverage and/or low liquidity are excluded from target portfolios 
(hypothesis 9). Ultimately, hypotheses 6 and 9 can be combined to explore whether target 
portfolio stock returns can be improved by screening for size, leverage and liquidity. 
We employ UK data between 1988 and 2011 to test our developed hypotheses. We find 
that a conventional target prediction model generates positive but marginal risk-adjusted 
returns of up to 0.4 percent per month (using the Capital Asset Pricing Model; CAPM), which 
is generally insignificant. This result is partly attributed to the model’s misclassification of 
several non-targets as targets (type II errors), as we find that target portfolios without type II 
errors generate substantial abnormal stock returns of up to 1.5 percent per month (CAPM), 
significant at the one percent level. While substantial, the annual buy-and-hold abnormal 
returns (BHAR) to these target-only portfolios are still well below the 19.5-31 percent BHAR 
or cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) to M&A targets reported in prior studies (Georgen and 
Renneboog, 2004; Danbolt, 2004; Gregory and O’Donohoe, 2014). This finding accentuates 
the significance of accurate timing in the prediction of potential targets. If the model selects 
targets too early, investors would achieve significant losses prior to the target price run-ups, as 
targets tend to underperform in the months leading up to a bid. If, on the contrary, the model 
predicts targets too late, the potential gains to investors are significantly reduced. We argue 
that accurate timing to minimise the effect of pre-bid underperformance while outsmarting 
other market participants remains a major challenge to the strategy. We explore whether this 
timing problem could be mitigated by the use of qualitative information, such as merger 
rumours. While our documented rumours are useful in improving timing (as several bids are 
preceded by rumours), the adoption of a rumour screening strategy does not allow us to 
generate significant abnormal returns.  
9 
 
Our study further highlights the tendency for target prediction models to identify a 
disproportionately high number of bankrupt firms as potential targets, leading to a significant 
reduction in stock returns. We explore different strategies for identifying and/or reducing the 
number of bankrupt firms within our target portfolios, including the use of Taffler Z scores and 
the use of size, liquidity and leverage screens. We find that the screening strategy substantially 
improves returns to target portfolios. For example, our target portfolio risk-adjusted returns 
(CAPM) increases from 0.4 percent per month (insignificant) to 0.7 percent (significant at the 
five percent level) when we exclude all predicted targets with high leverage (in the top two 
quintiles). A combination strategy which screens target portfolio by size, liquidity and leverage 
(i.e., eliminates predicted targets in the bottom two size quintiles or the bottom two liquidity 
quintiles or the top two leverage quintiles) generates significant risk-adjusted returns (CAPM) 
of 0.9 percent per month.   
The rest of our paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the data and 
methodology. Section 3 presents the empirical results, and Section 4 concludes.  
 
2. Data and methodology 
We start by identifying a sample of all firms that are or have been listed on the main 
market of the London Stock Exchange between July 1988 and June 2011.1 Financial firms (SIC 
code 6000–6999) are excluded from the analysis as they are known to follow unique reporting 
standards, which makes the interpretation of their financial ratios different from those of other 
firms (e.g., Renneboog and Trojanowski, 2007). The final sample consists of 2,970 firms. We 
                                                 
1 We use the RI datatype, which includes dividend payments only after 1988, to estimate stock returns. We include both 
live and dead firms to avoid survivorship bias. 
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obtain firm accounting data and stock returns from DataStream, and merger characteristics 
from Thomson OneBanker. The two databases are matched using firm DataStream codes.  
We focus on takeover bids, even if they eventually fail. Consistent with prior studies 
(e.g., Cornett et al., 2011; Ambrose and Megginson, 1992), we restrict our sample of targets to 
those that receive bids which, if completed, would result in the bidder gaining control (greater 
than 50 percent shareholding) of the target. We obtain data for 2,799 M&A announcements 
involving publicly listed UK targets between 1st June 1989 and 30th June 2011. This list 
excludes bids for minority interest, rumours or intentions, and announcements involving targets 
in the financial industry. We further exclude subsequent bids for the same target firm at 
different points within the same year. This generates a sample of 1,635 unique targets. In 
untabulated results, we find that out of an average of 1,471 listed firms per year, 74 firms (5.05 
percent of listed firms) receive a bid in any one year on average. This level of takeover activity 
is similar to the 5.00 percent (between 1986 and 1995) reported by Powell (2004), and varies 
from one year to another, with a high of 9.80 percent in 1997 and a low of 2.55 percent in 1993.  
We use time-varying firm, industry and market characteristics to predict potential 
takeover targets. In line with Palepu (1986), we first adopt the following five hypotheses for 
the prediction of takeover targets: inefficient management, firm undervaluation 
(misevaluation), industry disturbance, growth-resource mismatch and firm size hypotheses. 
Consistent with Powell (1997) and Ambrose and Megginson (1992), we also incorporate two 
additional hypotheses for takeover prediction: the free cash flow and the tangible assets 
hypotheses. Following Pakes and Ericson (1998) and Agarwal and Gort (2002), we add firm 
age as a determinant of firm takeover likelihood. These eight hypotheses, variants of which 
have been widely used across the literature (see, for example, Ambrose and Megginson, 1992; 
Barnes 1998, 1999, 2000; Powell, 1997, 2001, 2004; Espahbodi and Espahbodi, 2003), are 
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used to develop a ‘conventional’ model. Further details on these hypotheses are provided 
below. 
The inefficient management hypothesis stipulates that takeovers play a disciplinary role 
through which an underperforming management team is replaced through a takeover. We use 
two proxies, the return on capital employed (ROCE) and average monthly excess returns 
(AER), to capture management performance. Following Palepu (1986) and Powell and Yawson 
(2007), AER is computed as a firm’s average monthly excess return over the market (FTSE 
All Share) return for the year to June.  
The misvaluation hypothesis suggests that the stock market’s inefficiency in the 
valuation of firms has important effects on takeover activity. The effects arise from the bidders’ 
deliberate efforts to ‘profit by buying undervalued targets for cash at a price below 
fundamental value, or by paying equity for targets that, even if overvalued, are less overvalued 
than the bidder’ (Dong et al., 2006, p. 726). Following Shleifer and Vishny (2003) and Bi and 
Gregory (2011), in absolute terms (i.e., with no knowledge of the characteristics of the bidder), 
we would expect targets of cash acquisitions to be undervalued, and targets in stock-financed 
acquisitions to have higher valuation on average, and possibly even be overvalued.2 We use 
Tobin’s Q (market value to replacement cost of assets) to proxy for the level of target 
misvaluation. Consistent with Hasbrouck (1985) and Dong et al. (2006), Tobin’s Q is estimated 
as the sum of the book value of debt (i.e., the difference between the book value of assets and 
the book value of equity) and the market value of equity, scaled by the book value of assets. 
The industry disturbance hypothesis suggests that a firm’s takeover likelihood will 
increase with the announcement of a merger bid in that industry. Consistent with Palepu (1986), 
Walter (1994) and Lin et al. (2014), we use the industry disturbance dummy variable 
                                                 
2 We confirm this in additional analyses later in our study. 
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(IDDummy) to capture industry disturbances. IDDummy takes a value of one if any merger is 
completed within a firm’s industry in the year prior to the bid in question, and a value of zero 
otherwise. We define industries using the UK four-digit SIC code classification system. 
The growth-resource mismatch hypothesis suggests that low-growth but resource-rich 
firms, as well as high-growth but resource-poor firms, are more likely to become takeover 
targets. Consistent with prior studies (e.g., Palepu, 1986), we use four variables, including sales 
growth (SGrowth), firm liquidity (cash to total assets ratio), leverage (debt to equity ratio) and 
a growth-resource imbalance dummy variable (GRDummy), as proxies. An imbalance between 
growth opportunities and resources is said to occur when (1) a firm has high sales growth 
accompanied by low liquidity and high leverage, or when (2) a firm has low sales growth 
accompanied by high liquidity and low leverage. These variables are characterised as ‘low’ or 
‘high’ by comparing them with the four-digit SIC code industry-year average. The GRDummy 
takes a value of one in these two cases ((1) and (2) above) and a value of zero in all other 
combinations of growth, liquidity and leverage.  
The firm size hypothesis argues that takeover probability decreases with firm size, as 
the number of viable bidders for a target decreases as its size increases (Palepu, 1986; Powell, 
2001; Gorton et al., 2009). Consistent with Powell (1997), Powell and Yawson (2007), Cornett 
et al. (2011) and De and Jindra (2012), firm size is proxied by the natural log of total assets. 
The free cash flow hypothesis stipulates that takeover likelihood increases with a firm’s 
level of free cash flow. In an active market for corporate control, management which hoards or 
misappropriates excess free cash flow is likely to face a challenge for corporate control (Manne, 
1965; Jensen, 1986; Powell, 1997). Besides the opportunity to correct management 
inefficiency, the bidding firm is further attracted by the excess free cash flow in the target firm, 
as this free cash flow can be used to reduce the net cost of acquisition. Consistent with Powell 
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and Yawson (2007), free cash flow (FCF) is defined as the ratio of net cash flow from operating 
activities less capital expenditures scaled by total assets.   
The real property hypothesis predicts that firms with substantial tangible fixed assets 
(such as plant and machinery) in their total asset portfolio are more attractive targets to bidders 
(Ambrose and Megginson, 1992). Tangible fixed assets proxy for debt capacity and provide 
financial slack to enable a firm to raise debt capital in times of need (Myers and Majluf, 1984; 
Stulz and Johnson, 1985; Ambrose and Megginson, 1992). These assets can reduce a bidder’s 
implicit takeover cost, as they can be divested to raise the funds needed to complete the 
transaction. Consistent with prior studies (e.g., Powell, 1997; Ambrose and Megginson, 1992), 
the ratio of property, plant and equipment to total assets is used as a measure for tangible assets.  
The firm age hypothesis suggests that takeover probability decreases with firm age 
(Brar et al., 2009; Bhattacharjee et al., 2009; Loderer and Waelchli, 2015). Firm survival (age) 
is frequently attributed to a firm’s endowments and its tendency to learn-by-doing over time 
(Pakes and Ericson, 1998; Agarwal and Gort, 2002; Bhattacharjee et al., 2009). Agarwal and 
Gort (2002) contend that, over time, a firm gains knowledge about itself and its industry, which 
allows it to achieve cost reductions and product improvements, and develop new market 
techniques. Firm endowments are generally low when firms are born, but increase over time 
as firms invest in research and development (Agarwal and Gort, 2002). Hence, the probability 
of firm survival (takeover) within an industry increases (decreases) as firms grow older. Firm 
age is proxied by the number of years since incorporation.  
 A summary of our hypotheses and the component variables is shown in Appendix 1. 
We eliminate outliers from our dataset by winsorising ROCE, AER, Tobin’s Q, sales growth, 
liquidity, leverage, free cash flow and tangible assets at the 1st and 99th percentiles. No 
adjustments are made to the industry disturbance or growth-resource mismatch dummies, firm 
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size and firm age.3 Note that to mitigate any look-ahead bias, we impose a time lag in our model 
which maintains that a firm’s takeover probability in the next period (t+1) is a function of its 
publicly available financial information in the most recent period (t). We follow the June 
approach (Soares and Stark, 2009) by developing the model on June 30th of each year (using 
accounting data up to the financial year-end of 31st December of the previous year), to predict 
and invest in targets from July 1st. The computation of ratios which utilise market data matches, 
for example, June 30th (2010) market data with accounting statement data for the previous 
financial year-end (2009). Our final dataset is made up of 32,363 firm-year observations over 
a 22-year period (1988-2009).   
We model takeover likelihood in the spirit of Palepu (1986), Powell (2001), Cremers 
et al. (2009) and Lin et al. (2014). Our base regression model is the logit model given as 
follows: 
𝑃𝑖𝑡 =
1
1+𝑒−𝑍𝑖𝑡−1
            (1) 
where 𝑃𝑖𝑡 is the probability that firm i will be acquired in the current period (t) and 𝑍𝑖𝑡−1 is a 
vector of firm i’s characteristics in the previous period (t-1), given as follows: 
𝑍𝑖𝑡−1 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑋1𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑋2𝑖𝑡−1 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑘𝑋𝑘𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡−1,   (2) 
𝛽0 is the intercept term and 𝛽𝑗  (j = 1,…, k) represents the coefficients associated with the 
corresponding independent variables 𝑋𝑗 (j = 1,…, k) for each firm. The dependent variable 𝑃𝑖𝑡 
in our model takes the value of one if a firm (i) is the subject of a takeover in a period (t), and 
a value of zero otherwise.  
 
                                                 
3 In untabulated results, we follow alternative outlier treatments, and results remain qualitatively similar. 
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3.  Empirical results 
3.1 Descriptive statistics and model development 
We start by developing our prediction model using our panel dataset. Table 1 reports 
the differences in the characteristics of targets and non-targets within a univariate framework. 
We find that targets have higher operating performance (ROCE), but experience lower excess 
stock returns (AER) than non-targets in the year prior to a merger announcement. These results 
are consistent with Agarwal and Jaffe’s (2003) finding that US targets do not underperform in 
terms of operating performance, but do not support their argument that the targets do not also 
underperform in terms of stock market performance. The targets in our sample have a lower 
Tobin’s Q, lower liquidity and higher leverage in relation to counterpart non-targets. We further 
find that targets have higher levels of tangible assets and free cash flow, and are younger 
compared to non-targets. The higher free cash flow of targets is, perhaps, due to their higher 
levels of profitability. The results on firm size (i.e., targets are larger than non-targets) are 
particularly puzzling, as some studies (including Barnes, 1999 and Powell, 2001) hypothesise 
a negative relation between firm size and takeover likelihood. In untabulated results, we find 
that the purported negative relation is only robust when we exclude small firms from our 
sample. The results are consistent with Powell and Yawson (2007), who find that UK targets 
have significantly lower liquidity, higher leverage, lower stock returns and larger size 
compared to non-targets. Our findings are robust to different outlier management procedures 
and consistent with the management inefficiency, misevaluation (undervaluation argument), 
tangible property, free cash flow and firm age hypotheses.  
[Insert Table 1 around here] 
We use a multivariate framework to explore the relation between the above firm 
characteristics and firm takeover likelihood by estimating binomial logistic regressions. We 
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first estimate Pearson and Spearman correlations and the variance inflation factors. These 
results are available upon request. We find that the level of correlation among our variables is 
modest and unlikely to lead to multicollinearity concerns. Table 2 reports the parameter 
coefficients of the logistic regressions, where the dependent variable is the takeover likelihood. 
We present results for logit estimations with clustering of standard errors by firm and year.  
[Insert Table 2 around here] 
We find empirical support for the inefficient management (average excess return), 
undervaluation (Tobin’s Q), tangible assets, free cash flow and firm age hypotheses, but no 
support for the growth resource mismatch, industry disturbance or firm size hypotheses. The 
coefficients of the growth-resource mismatch and industry disturbance dummies are not 
significant, but we find that takeover likelihood declines with firm liquidity. Our main results 
are consistent with those reported in prior UK studies, such as Powell and Yawson (2007), who 
for UK firms between 1992 and 2001 find that takeover likelihood decreases with average 
abnormal returns and increases with firm size.  
3.2 Model predictive ability 
As in prior studies (e.g., Palepu, 1986; Bartley and Boardman, 1990; Barnes, 1999, 
2000; Espahbodi and Espahbodi, 2003; Powell, 2001; Pasiouras et al., 2007), we employ an 
out-of-sample period to also evaluate the predictive ability of the model. Firms are ranked by 
their predicted takeover probability, and the 20 percent of firms with the highest takeover 
probability (Quintile 5 or Q5) is selected as our target portfolio.4 Following Cremers et al. 
(2009), we adopt a recursive model evaluation technique, where the model is recurrently 
redeveloped using new data and is tested over several holdout periods between 1995 and 2009. 
                                                 
4 In untabulated results, we use alternative size portfolios, such as decile portfolios, to determine potential targets, and 
conclusions remain qualitatively similar.  
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The target concentration ratio, a measure of model performance, is the proportion of True 
Positives within the target portfolios. 
As shown in Figure 1, we find that the target concentration ratio achieved by the model 
(in the top quintile) varies throughout the sample period and is, on average, equal to 8.52 
percent. The model correctly predicts a total of 302 targets, out of 3,545 predictions over the 
fifteen-year period. Note that the model outperforms prior UK models5 as well as a random 
selection approach to target prediction. Recall that in any one year, on average 5.05 percent of 
our population were targets, and therefore the model’s predictive ability outperforms a random 
selection of potential targets. The average difference in target concentration ratio across the 
fifteen-year holdout period is significant at the one percent level (p-value of 0.000).  
[Insert Figure 1 around here] 
3.3 Abnormal returns earned by the target prediction model 
Next, we estimate the abnormal stock returns generated by the prediction model using 
monthly stock returns, as advocated by Gilbert et al. (2014). Given the general scepticism about 
the UK’s version of the Carhart (1997) model (see Gregory et al., 2013), we adjust our target 
portfolio returns for risk using the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) of Sharpe (1964) and 
the Fama and French (1992) three-factor model (FF3F), and by also using control or benchmark 
portfolios.6 The data for the monthly risk-free rate (RF), the monthly market return (RM) and 
the risk factors, including size (SMB) and book-to-market (HML), are collected from Gregory 
et al. (2013). We compute buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) using market, size, market-
to-book and combined size and book-to-market benchmark portfolios following the procedure 
                                                 
5 We compare our results directly with those of prior UK studies, mainly Powell (2001, 2004). Sample restrictions do not 
allow for a direct comparison with Barnes (1998, 1999, 2000) and Powell (1997). We adopt the same time period and 
portfolio selection approach used by Powell (2001, 2004) for developing and testing our model. Powell (2001) and Powell 
(2004) achieve an out-of-sample target concentration of 2.44 percent and 4.72 percent in 1996, respectively. Our model 
achieves a higher target concentration of 12.5 percent in the same period.  
6 Results for Carhart model estimations are not materially different. These results are available on request. 
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in Barber and Lyon (1997). In each year, we calculate the buy-and-hold return (BHR) on each 
security in our sample using monthly returns in the year to June. All firms in each year 
constitute our market benchmark portfolio. To generate the size (or the book-to-market) 
benchmark portfolios, we first rank firms by their market value (or book-to-market value) on 
the 1st of July of each year. Next, we group them into ten deciles, with decile 10 constituting 
the ten percent of firms with the largest market (or book-to-market) value in each year. Finally, 
we combine our ten size and ten book-to-market deciles to create 100 portfolios (combinations) 
ranked by both size and book-to-market values. As in Barber and Lyon (1997), a firm’s BHAR 
is the difference between its BHR and the BHR of its corresponding size, book-to-market and 
combined size and book-to-market benchmark portfolio. The BHAR of the predicted target 
portfolio is obtained by averaging the BHARs of its constituent firms in each period. Following 
Lyon et al. (1999), we compute bootstrapped skewness-adjusted t-statistics and p-values for 
portfolios’ BHARs by drawing 1,000 bootstrapped resamples, each of a size equal to a quarter 
of our portfolio size (i.e.,  n/4). Table 3 presents results for equal-weighted portfolio abnormal 
returns (CAPM and FF3F regression alphas and BHARs). 
[Insert Table 3 around here] 
As in Model 1 of Table 3, we find that over the fifteen-year out-of-sample period, the 
prediction model generates CAPM risk-adjusted returns of 0.4 percent per month, which are 
not significant at the ten percent level (p-value of 0.191). The result obtained using the FF3F 
model is slightly lower (0.3 percent per month) but also significant at the ten percent level (p-
value of 0.099). Results obtained using the BHAR benchmarks are positive but, with the 
exception of the market and book-to-market benchmarks, not significant at the ten percent 
level. 7 Overall, the results suggest that the risk-adjusted returns to the standard strategy of 
                                                 
7 In untabulated results, we estimate abnormal returns for different portfolio formation strategies, including deciles and 
optimal cut-off probabilities (see Powell, 2001). Our results remain qualitatively similar.  
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investing in predicted target portfolios are marginal (if any). The model’s risk-adjusted return 
for the period 1st July 1996 to 30th June 2011 is, however, higher than the -4 percent per year 
(January to December) reported by Powell (2001) for predicted UK targets in 1996. It is, 
nonetheless, lower than the 0.6 percent per month reported by Brar et al. (2009) for predicted 
EU targets between January 1995 and December 2003. Overall, the results suggest that, despite 
our ability to correctly predict some targets, generating risk-adjusted returns from the strategy 
is challenging. In the remainder of the study, we explore why generating abnormal returns from 
predicted target portfolios is a difficult pursuit, and we recommend implementable strategies 
for improving target portfolio returns.  
3.4 Portfolio timing and target portfolio returns 
3.4.1 Prediction errors partly explain portfolio underperformance 
We first explore whether prediction errors are responsible for the low returns to our 
target portfolio. If, in every year, we could accurately predict and invest in all the targets in the 
full sample, we would have generated CAPM-adjusted returns or a BHAR of about 1.20 
percent per month (p-value < 0.000) over the holding period (Table 3, Model 2). Indeed, we 
fail to include 76.69 percent of actual targets in our portfolio. In addition, the model predicts 
that some of the firms in the sample will receive a bid during a particular year, but in 91.48 
percent of instances (on average), no bid occurs (i.e., type II errors). However, we find that 
some of the type II errors eventually receive a takeover bid in a subsequent period.8 This 
suggests that portfolios might underperform because of the presence of type II errors and/or 
because of the time gap between the month/year of portfolio formation and the time of the 
actual bid. We first explore whether the type II errors within our portfolios exceptionally 
underperform or contribute to the poor returns to these portfolios. In empirical terms, we 
                                                 
8 Some examples include National Express, UK Coal and JJB Sport. UK Coal, for example, appears in our target portfolio 
in 1997, 1998, 1999, 2002, 2007 and 2008 but only receives a bid in 2008. 
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evaluate whether portfolios that fail to correctly predict any target significantly underperform. 
Conversely, as per hypothesis 2, we also investigate whether predicted target portfolios without 
type II errors generate positive abnormal stock returns.  
As shown in Model 4 of Table 3, we find that the portfolio of type II errors does not 
generate positive abnormal returns. When we exclude actual targets from our portfolios, the 
CAPM alphas to these portfolios decline from 0.4 percent (in Model 1) to 0 percent per month 
(in Model 4). Similar results are obtained when other risk adjustment models, including FF3F 
and benchmark portfolios, are employed. Inconsistent with prior suggestions that type II errors 
are exceptional underperformers (Powell, 2001; Cahan et al., 2011), the portfolio of type II 
errors (Model 4) does not underperform the non-targets in the portfolio of predicted non-targets 
(Model 7). The non-targets in the portfolio of predicted non-targets generate a much lower 
CAPM-adjusted return of -0.6 percent per month (p-value of 0.050) and a FF3F-adjusted return 
of -0.8 percent per month (p-value < 0.000). As predicted by hypothesis 2, when type II errors 
are excluded from our target portfolio (Model 3), the risk-adjusted portfolio returns (CAPM) 
increase from 0.4 percent (p-value of 0.190) to 1.5 percent per month (p-value of 0.000). 
Overall, these results suggest that the targets which we correctly predict significantly contribute 
to improving the abnormal returns to our portfolios. Consistent with our first and second 
hypotheses, the evidence suggests that type II errors are principally responsible for the 
underperformance of our portfolios. In a later section, we revisit the issue of whether type II 
errors in the prediction model can be reduced. 
3.4.2 Accurate timing is required to optimise returns to target portfolios 
Although the results in Model 3 of Table 3 show that the targets in our portfolio generate 
significant returns, the estimated annual BHAR of 14 percent (market benchmark) for this 
portfolio is substantially lower than the 19.5 to 31 percent abnormal returns to targets reported 
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in prior studies (Jensen and Ruback, 1983; Franks and Harris, 1989; Georgen and Renneboog, 
2004; Danbolt, 2004; Gregory and O’Donohoe, 2014). As per our hypothesis 3, we explore 
whether this difference can be attributed to the timing of bid announcements versus our 
portfolio inception dates. Panel A of Figure 2 shows the distribution of merger bids throughout 
a year, and, as expected, there is no clear pattern. Following the June approach, we use a 
portfolio inception date of July 1st in each year, but only 8.7 percent of the bids in our sample 
are announced in July. There is thus a time gap between the month of the portfolio formation 
and the actual bid month in 91.3 percent of cases. Panel B of Figure 2 estimates the cumulative 
abnormal monthly returns to all targets in the sample, starting from 12 months before the bid 
(month -12) and ending 12 months after the bid (month 12). Consistent with the inefficient 
management hypothesis, we find that targets tend to perform poorly several months prior to 
receiving a bid. For example, the cumulative monthly stock returns from -11 months to -3 
months are approximately -13 percent. Some of these negative returns are captured in the 
portfolios, given that researchers generally adopt a fixed portfolio holding period, such as the 
June approach. Consistent with our third hypothesis, this timing problem perhaps explains why 
a conventional annual rebalancing of portfolios generates lower than expected abnormal 
holding-period returns for actual targets.    
[Insert Figure 2 around here] 
3.4.3 Market anticipation reduces returns to predicted targets 
As the Efficient Market Hypothesis suggests, the prediction model would generate 
abnormal returns only if we can predict targets before other market participants. If our 
predictions are shared by the market,9 we should expect to earn lower returns from them even 
when they come to fruition. Figure 3 shows the abnormal stock returns over the period from 
                                                 
9 The prediction model that we adopt in this study is in the public domain. Hence, we can reasonably expect that a similar 
model will be used by other market participants. 
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20 days (one trading month) before the merger announcement for firms with high takeover 
probability (predicted targets) that actually received a bid, and counterpart firms with low 
takeover probability (predicted non-targets) that received a bid. Predicted non-targets which 
receive a bid are likely to be a surprise to the market. Consistent with our fourth hypothesis, 
we find that firms with high takeover probability (Quintile 5, Figure 3) experience higher pre-
bid target price run-ups and lower announcement returns (-1,1 days) in relation to their 
predicted non-target counterparts (Quintile 1, Figure 3). For example, the announcement effect 
for firms with low takeover probability is 22.50 percent versus 16.01 percent for high takeover 
probability counterparts. The difference is significant at the five percent level. 
[Insert Figure 3 around here] 
Consistent with our fourth hypothesis, our results suggest that some of the actual targets 
that the model succeeds in predicting do not earn high abnormal returns, as might be expected 
from the M&A literature, perhaps due to parallel anticipation by other market participants. 
These results further emphasise the importance of timing, as the challenge is not only to 
correctly predict targets just a few months before takeover bids in order to avoid the pre-bid 
systematic target underperformance, but also to predict them ahead of other market 
participants. 
3.4.4 Can portfolio timing and returns be improved using rumour data? 
We now explore whether we can improve portfolio timing and reduce the effect of 
target pre-bid underperformance by using qualitative market signals, such as merger rumours. 
Given that rumours occur at specific dates, and prior studies (e.g., Jindra and Walking, 2004; 
Ahern and Sosyura, 2015; Chou et al., 2015) suggest that several takeovers are preceded by 
rumours, we explore whether information about the specific month in which a rumour occurs 
could be useful in improving the timing of portfolios. We collect data on merger rumours from 
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Thomson OneBanker, where the rumoured targets are UK firms in our sample whose M&A 
deal status is described as “intended, rumour or seeking buyer”. 10  For simplicity, we 
collectively describe these deals as “rumours” in subsequent discussions. We do not exclude 
cases in which the intent is eventually withdrawn, the rumour discontinued or the target 
withdraws its search for a buyer, as this could bias the analysis. However, the results do not 
change qualitatively when we exclude such cases. 
Out of 453 takeover rumour-related news items over our portfolio holding period (1st 
July 1996 to 30th June 2011), 115 items correspond to firms in our target portfolio (an average 
of 7.67 rumours per year) and 70 correspond to firms in our non-target portfolio (an average of 
4.67 rumours per year). The difference is statistically significant at the one percent level, 
suggesting an association between merger rumours and takeover likelihood.  
We explore whether this set of rumours could be used to improve target portfolio 
returns. Focusing on rumours in our target portfolio, we plot (in Figure 4) the cumulative 
abnormal stock returns (1) around rumours, for all rumoured targets; (2) around rumours, for 
all rumoured targets that eventually receive a takeover bid; and (3) around merger bids, for all 
rumoured targets. That is, (2) and (3) plot the rumour returns and eventual bid announcement 
returns, respectively, for bids which are preceded by merger rumours. Note that, as shown in 
the figure, most of the returns to rumoured targets (1) are earned on the day when the rumour 
emerges. Some of these rumoured targets eventually receive takeover bids (2). Importantly, the 
rumoured targets which eventually receive takeover bids (2) also earn significant abnormal 
returns when the merger bid is formally announced (3). This suggests that while we might not 
                                                 
10 An example of a rumour reported in Thomson OneBanker on 24th September 2009 is the following: “Microsoft Corp of 
the US was rumoured to be planning to launch a tender offer to acquire the entire share capital of Autonomy Corp PLC, 
a Cambridge-based developer of infrastructure software”.  
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benefit from the initial rumour (as we are unlikely to be able to anticipate its emergence ex 
ante), we might earn returns once the rumour is followed by a formal takeover bid.  
[Insert Figure 4 around here] 
We use rumours to screen our target portfolio by investing in predicted targets only 
when they are associated with a rumour. To avoid look-ahead bias, we compute risk-adjusted 
returns to the rumoured target portfolio, starting from the month following the month in which 
the rumour emerges. As shown in Table 3 (Model 9), we find that the rumoured target portfolio 
generates risk-adjusted returns which are insignificant.11 Overall, these results suggest that, 
while there is a significant association between merger rumours and the emergence of takeover 
bids, such merger rumours (at least those in OneBanker) are unlikely to be useful when 
attempting to generate returns from the takeover prediction modelling. One reason for this is, 
perhaps, the limited number of rumours in our sample; there are several months/periods in 
which we do not invest in predicted targets as no rumours emerge. Overall, we do not find a 
viable solution to the timing problem. 
3.5 Distressed firms and target portfolio returns 
3.5.1 Distressed firms are misclassified as potential targets  
Evidence suggests that target and distressed (or bankrupt) firms share common firm 
characteristics (Powell and Yawson, 2007), which may explain the difficulty of generating 
abnormal returns from target portfolios. Consistent with this evidence, as shown in Figure 1, 
target prediction models are likely to classify a disproportionately high number of financially 
distressed (or bankrupt) firms as potential targets. In this study, we identify bankrupt UK firms 
using the LSPD’s Master Index File. Firms with the following ‘Type of Death’ identifications 
                                                 
11 If we are able to capture the rumour returns as in Model 8, i.e., we invest in rumours before they emerge, the strategy 
yields a positive but statistically insignificant return. This is clearly not implementable. 
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are considered bankrupt: liquidation, delisted and all dealings terminated, receiver appointed, 
administrative receivership, and cancelled or suspended. In our analyses of portfolio returns, a 
-100 percent return in the firm delisting month has been assumed and was inserted to adjust for 
bankruptcy cost to investors.  
Consistent with Powell and Yawson (2007), the results show that target portfolios have 
a disproportionately higher number of bankrupt firms. Indeed, 43.75 percent (and 13.54 
percent) of the bankrupt firms in the sample are included in the quintile of firms with the highest 
(and lowest) takeover likelihood. This complements Pastena and Ruland’s (1986) and Clark 
and Ofek’s (1994) argument that mergers and bankruptcies are alternative forms of 
reorganisation for firms in distress. To investigate the impact of bankrupt firms on abnormal 
stock returns, we exclude bankrupt firms from the target portfolios and compute the abnormal 
target returns to these portfolios. As shown in Table 4 (Model 1), we find that the returns to 
target portfolios generally improve significantly when bankrupt firms are excluded. The 
CAPM-adjusted portfolio returns become 0.6 percent per month, and are now significant at the 
five percent level. The monthly risk-adjusted returns generated using the FF3F model and 
benchmark portfolios are similarly about 0.2 percentage points higher. Nonetheless, for this to 
be implementable, one must be able to successfully identify and exclude bankrupt firms from 
target portfolios ex ante.  
3.5.2 The impact of distressed firms can be limited by imposing a ‘Z score’, ‘size’, 
‘leverage’ or ‘liquidity’ screen 
We explore two main options for identifying bankrupt firms ex ante and mitigating their 
effects on portfolio returns. The first is to employ an existing bankruptcy prediction model to 
identify and exclude firms that have a high probability of going bankrupt, and the second is to 
use simple proxies for bankruptcy risk (firm market capitalisation, liquidity and/or leverage) to 
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screen our portfolios for firms with high bankruptcy risk. Agarwal and Taffler (2008) suggest 
that the Taffler Z score model is still efficient in identifying firms in financial distress. We use 
model parameters from Taffler (1983) to estimate Taffler Z scores for all firms in our sample 
in every year between 1995 and 2009. In the next stage, we rank all firms in our sample by Z 
score and, from our target portfolio, we successively exclude all firms with Z scores in the 
bottom (Model 2) and bottom two Z score quintiles (Model 3).12 This allows us to invest only 
in predicted targets with corresponding high Z scores. The risk-adjusted returns to target 
portfolios improve as we sequentially eliminate the first and then first and second quintiles of 
firms with low Z scores (Table 4, Models 2 and 3). The results do not improve further when 
more quintiles (i.e., third and fourth quintiles) are excluded. 
In the second instance, we use firm market capitalisation as a proxy for financial 
distress, as research suggests that firms with higher market capitalisation are less likely to 
reorganise through bankruptcy (Pastena and Ruland, 1986; Clark and Ofek, 1994). We consider 
a simple size screening strategy, where we invest equally in all predicted targets with a market 
value above a certain threshold. In untabulated results, when we impose a size threshold of £50 
million (comparable to the $100 million imposed by Brar et al. (2009)), we are able to exclude 
99.3 percent of bankrupt firms in our target portfolio, but we also exclude 33 percent of actual 
targets in this portfolio. Consistent with hypothesis 6, this significant reduction in the number 
of bankrupt firms allows us to generate significant CAPM-adjusted returns of 0.6 percent per 
month (p-value of 0.071). Consistent with hypothesis 7, the returns to target portfolios fall 
when substantially higher thresholds are imposed. For example, when a market value threshold 
of £500 million is imposed, the portfolio alpha (CAPM) is equal to 0.2 percent (p-value of 
0.972). In untabulated results, we also find that other thresholds between £50 million and £500 
                                                 
12 In untabulated results, we also apply the zero Z score threshold suggested by Taffler (1983) to identify and exclude 
firms in financial distress from the target portfolio. This allows us to only eliminate 27.0 percent of bankrupt firms in the 
predicted target portfolio, and our target portfolio monthly FF3F–adjusted return falls from 0.3 percent (Table 3, Model 
2) to 0.2 percent (and is no longer statistically significant). 
27 
 
million do not lead to substantial improvements in performance. Given that the £50 million 
threshold eliminates 99.3 percent of the bankrupt firms, this finding supports our contention 
that the improvement in portfolio returns when size screening is employed is largely explained 
by its exclusion of bankrupt firms.  
To complement the use of size thresholds (for consistency), we rank all firms in our 
sample by market capitalisation, and successively exclude firms in the bottom size quintiles 
from our target portfolios. The returns to these target portfolios are reported in Table 4 (Models 
5 and 6). Consistent with hypothesis 6, the results show that the elimination of predicted targets 
in the bottom two size quintiles leads to a slight improvement in portfolio returns (e.g., from 
CAPM-adjusted returns of 0.4 to 0.5 percent per month).13 
Our eighth hypothesis is that traditional value-weighting strategies might not address 
the issue of bankruptcy of firms in our target portfolio. As in Table 4 (Model 4), consistent 
with this hypothesis, a value-weighting strategy does not yield significant positive portfolio 
returns. While such a strategy gives less weight to firms which are more likely to go bankrupt 
(i.e., small firms), it also gives more weight to large firms which are less likely to receive 
takeover bids. The net effect is that the strategy does not improve the returns from target 
prediction.  
[Insert Table 4 around here] 
Following our ninth hypothesis, we use firm leverage and liquidity to screen target 
portfolios for firms in financial distress by successively eliminating all firms in the top leverage 
and bottom liquidity quintiles before computing the portfolio risk-adjusted returns. Results 
from Models 7 and 8 of Table 4 show that portfolio returns continuously improve as we 
eliminate highly leveraged firms. When we eliminate the top two leverage quintiles, our 
                                                 
13 Additionally, the imposition of a higher size threshold (i.e., the elimination of Q1 and Q2 as opposed to just Q1) leads 
to significant FF3F, market BHAR and BTM BHAR, as shown in Model 6 of Table 4. 
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portfolios report FF3F- and CAPM-adjusted returns of 0.7 percent per month, as well as 
BHARs of 0.4 percent per month, significant at the five percent level (Model 8). Similarly, the 
returns to our target portfolios improve as we eliminate stocks with low liquidity. For example, 
we achieve target portfolio CAPM-adjusted returns of 0.6 percent (p-value of 0.053) when we 
exclude all firms in the bottom two liquidity quintiles (Model 10). As before, the results do not 
further improve when the third and fourth quintiles are also excluded. Ultimately, as in Model 
11, we find that we can generate substantial risk-adjusted returns when we screen our target 
portfolios using all three criteria (size, liquidity and leverage). The portfolios achieve CAPM-
adjusted returns of 0.9 percent per month (p-value of 0.021), FF3F-adjusted returns of 0.8 per 
month (p-value of 0.007) and BHARs of between 0.7 and 0.9 percent per month (significant at 
the one percent level). These results provide evidence to support the use of our portfolio 
screening strategy. Overall, these results suggest that takeover prediction as an investment 
strategy is potentially profitable when steps can be taken to mitigate the effects of financially 
distressed firms within target portfolios.  
3.6 Additional analyses 
In this section, we perform four additional analyses to explore whether we can even 
further improve our results. In the first analysis, we consider whether an extended prediction 
model (i.e., one with more predictive variables) yields better results by reducing type II errors 
in prediction. In the second, we test whether we can improve model predictive ability, and 
hence portfolio returns, by using industry-adjusted firm ratios. In the third, we explore whether 
a multinomial model which predicts targets by method of payment potentially generates higher 
portfolio abnormal returns. In the final analysis, we investigate whether a hedge strategy 
(involving the short-selling of distressed firms) can be used to further improve the returns to 
our portfolios. We discuss these below. 
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The findings from Table 3 suggest that prediction errors were partly responsible for the 
poor performance of target portfolios generated from conventional prediction models. In the 
first analysis, we explore whether the predictive ability of the conventional prediction model 
can be improved by incorporating variables that have been shown in recent studies to explain 
takeover likelihood. Following recent M&A studies, we augment the conventional model by 
further adding industry concentration (Powell and Yawson, 2007), a block holders dummy 
(Cremers et al., 2009), price momentum, trading volume, a market sentiment dummy (Brar et 
al., 2009), and a rumour dummy (Siganos and Papa, 2015) as variables that can potentially 
explain a firm’s takeover likelihood. We eliminate outliers by winsorising price momentum at 
the 1st and 99th percentiles, but no adjustments are made to the other variables. The hypotheses 
and their proxies are summarised in Appendix 2. We use these new variables to develop an 
expanded (augmented) model, which we use to generate new predicted target portfolios.14  
The conventional and augmented models identify similar firms as potential targets, with 
77.64 percent of firms predicted as targets by the conventional model also predicted as targets 
by the augmented model. Nonetheless, the augmented model predicts 3,526 targets over fifteen 
years, of which only 280 become actual targets – a target concentration of 7.94 percent, 
compared to the 8.52 percent achieved by the conventional model. This suggests that we do 
not improve the conventional model’s predictive ability by adding the new variables suggested 
in recent studies.  
Next, we explore whether portfolios generated from the augmented model earn risk-
adjusted returns before and after our suggested strategies are applied. The results are reported 
in Table 5. We find that the CAPM abnormal return to the portfolio of predicted targets 
generated by the augmented model is 0.2 percent per month, but insignificant, with a p-value 
                                                 
14 The model parameters for the full sample period are available upon request. 
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of 0.567. The BHARs across all benchmarks are not significantly different from zero. We 
replicate our strategies of sequentially eliminating firms with low Z scores, low market values, 
high leverage and low liquidity. As shown in Table 5, the augmented model generates lower 
risk-adjusted returns across all strategies than the conventional model (Table 4). When 
portfolios are screened by size, liquidity and leverage, it also generates substantial but slightly 
lower risk-adjusted returns across all models. Overall, these results show that the conventional 
model performs well and is not substantially improved by including new predictive variables 
(such as those in Appendix 2). We therefore do not have a clear answer as to how to improve 
the prediction model so as to reduce the number of type II errors.  
[Insert Table 5 around here] 
In the second test, we explore whether the predictive ability of the conventional model 
can be improved by scaling the accounting variables by their industry averages to derive 
industry-adjusted accounting variables. As noted in Powell (2001), the use of industry-relative 
ratios can improve data stability in long-run prediction studies. Further, firms that ‘stand-out’ 
from their counterparts in the industry (e.g., by performing comparatively poorly) are perhaps 
more likely to be targeted for takeover. We find that the predictive ability of the model declines 
slightly when all firm variables (except dummy variables) are scaled by their industry averages. 
The industry-adjusted model achieves a slightly lower target concentration of 8.24 percent 
compared to the 8.52 percent achieved by the conventional model. As shown in Table 6, this 
lower predictive ability leads to lower returns to target portfolios (Model 1). The returns remain 
low and insignificant (e.g., CAPM-adjusted returns of 0.3 percent per month, p-value of 0.339) 
even after screening portfolios for size, liquidity and leverage (Model 2). The decline in 
CAPM-adjusted abnormal returns from 0.9 percent per month (Table 4, Model 11) is, perhaps, 
too great to be simply explained by the slight decline in target concentration. Upon further 
analysis, we find that only 50.63 percent of firms predicted as targets by the conventional model 
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are also predicted as targets by the industry-adjusted conventional model. This suggests that 
the industry-adjusted model predicts a new set of targets, perhaps those which ‘stand-out’ from 
their counterparts but do not perform as well. The result is that the portfolios generated by the 
industry-adjusted model earn abnormal returns which are not statistically significant at the ten 
percent level. 
[Insert Table 6 around here] 
Prior studies have shown that the returns to targets vary by method of payment, with 
targets of cash bids typically earning significantly higher announcement returns (Danbolt, 
2004). In the third analysis, we test whether we can generate higher abnormal returns from 
takeover prediction by focusing on potential targets of cash bids. To explore this, we identify 
the method of payment (stock, cash and mixed) for each of the bids in our sample. This allows 
us to use existing variables from our conventional model to develop a multinomial model which 
predicts whether a firm will receive a cash bid, stock bid, mixed pay bid or no bid. In this 
model, 𝑃𝑖𝑡 (from equation 1) takes a value of zero if no takeover is announced in a period (t); 
one if a firm (i) is the subject of a takeover where the bidder offers cash as the method of 
payment; two when the bidder offers stock; and three when the bidder offers a mix of cash and 
stock in exchange for the target’s shares. With the exception of valuation and size, we do not 
find substantial variability in the financial characteristics of targets of ‘cash’, ‘stock’ and 
‘mixed’ methods of payment bids as proxied by our hypotheses. 15  The results from our 
multinomial model suggest that targets in cash acquisitions are typically undervalued (low 
Tobin’s Q), while targets in stock acquisitions typically have higher Tobin’s Q ratios. These 
results are consistent with Shleifer and Vishny (2003) and Bi and Gregory (2011). They also 
support Dong et al.’s (2006) contention that takeovers are driven by bidders who deliberately 
                                                 
15 The parameters of this model for the full sample period are available upon request. 
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seek to profit from investor misvaluation by buying undervalued targets for cash or by paying 
equity for overvalued targets. Consistent with our transaction cost argument (Palepu, 1986; 
Powell, 2001; Gorton et al., 2009), we also find some evidence suggesting that bidders are 
likely to offer cash to purchase small targets but are likely to offer stock when bidding for 
larger targets.  
We follow our recursive approach to generate new parameters for this model, predicting 
targets by method of payment, one year ahead, for the period 1995-2009. Using ‘non-target’ as 
our base category in the multinomial regression, we generate probabilities that each firm-year 
observation in the holdout period will be a ‘cash’, ‘stock’ or ‘mixed pay’ target. We then use 
our ‘cash’ takeover probability to rank firms and generate our quintile target portfolios as 
before. The multinomial model predicting ‘cash targets’ makes 3,542 predictions over the 
holdout period (1995-2009), of which 281 (7.93 percent) turn out to be actual targets. The 281 
actual targets consist of 215 (6.07 percent) ‘cash’ targets, 43 (1.21 percent) ‘stock’ targets and 
23 (0.65 percent) ‘mixed pay’ targets. Besides misclassifying non-targets as potential ‘cash’ 
targets, the model also misclassifies ‘stock’ targets and ‘mixed pay’ targets as potential ‘cash’ 
targets. The ‘cash’ target concentration (6.07 percent), as well as the overall target 
concentration (7.93 percent), achieved by the multinomial model is lower than the 
concentration achieved by the conventional model (8.52 percent). As expected, this (slightly) 
lower predictive ability also translates into (slightly) lower portfolio abnormal returns, as 
shown in Table 6 (Models 3 and 4). The abnormal returns from this model are about 0.1 
percentage points lower than those from the conventional model. The results suggest that the 
multinomial model is not a substantial improvement on the conventional model. 
The results from Table 4 suggest that the returns to target portfolios generated using the 
conventional model can be improved by screening for size, liquidity and leverage – a process 
which reduces the proportion of distressed firms in predicted target portfolios. In our final test, 
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we explore whether there are benefits to pursuing a hedge strategy which involves holding the 
portfolio of screened targets and also short-selling the distressed stocks. It is worth noting that 
such a strategy might be unimplementable due to the practical difficulty of short-selling some 
of these small and/or distressed stocks. The results from this analysis are presented in Table 6 
(Model 5). We find, to the extent that this is implementable, the hedge strategy yields returns 
which are slightly higher than those generated by a simple screening strategy. The results from 
the CAPM and FF3F models are similar (0.9 percent per month), but the market benchmark 
BHAR from the hedge strategy increases to 1.4 percent per month. 
4.  Conclusion 
Several studies have investigated whether abnormal returns can be earned by investing 
in portfolios of predicted targets. Even without considering the negative impact of bankrupt 
firms within predicted target portfolios, the results from prior research suggest that the strategy 
is unlikely to yield consistent returns for investors. We contribute to this literature by exploring 
the challenges of generating abnormal returns from target prediction modelling and identifying 
ways in which some of these challenges can be mitigated. Our initial results suggest that 
portfolio returns are contingent on our ability to correctly predict targets, as type II errors within 
our target portfolio reduce the returns to these portfolios. Nonetheless, by comparing the 
performance of an augmented and a conventional model, we find that the performance of the 
prediction model does not improve when we simply expand the number of predictive variables 
in models.  
We attribute some of the poor performance of target portfolios to seemingly 
unavoidable inefficiencies in the timing of predictions. The fact that targets typically 
underperform several months prior to bids, and the difficulty of accurately timing predictions 
(to minimise periods of pre-bid underperformance yet outsmart other market participants), 
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appear to be drawbacks of the strategy. Our results show that qualitative information, such as 
merger rumours, could potentially be used to screen target portfolios and partly alleviate the 
timing problem. However, based on our limited dataset of merger rumours, we do not find 
evidence that target portfolios generate significant risk-adjusted returns when a rumour screen 
is applied. Nonetheless, this timing issue diminishes but does not eliminate the prospect of 
earning positive abnormal returns from the target prediction strategy.  
Our results also reveal that predicted target portfolios do not earn positive abnormal 
returns, due to the tendency for a disproportionate number of poorly-performing firms, some 
of which end up going bankrupt, to be misclassified as expected takeover targets. Given that 
bankrupt firms tend to be smaller, less liquid and highly leveraged, we show that a simple size, 
leverage or liquidity screening strategy can be used to mitigate much of the negative effect of 
bankrupt and distressed firms within target portfolios. We provide evidence that the adoption 
of this recommended strategy leads to the generation of significant positive abnormal returns 
of up to 0.9 percent per month. Similar or even slightly higher returns could be achieved if one 
is able to further short-sell these high bankruptcy risk firms. Overall, the results of the study 
provide a foundation for the development of optimal portfolio strategies for academic and 
practitioner purposes.  
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Appendix 1 
Hypotheses, proxies and constituent DataStream variables 
Hypotheses Proxies (Exp. sign) DataStream codes/Data source 
Inefficient management 
ROCE (–)  wc01250, wc03998 
AER (–) RI (Firm and FTSE ALL Share index) 
Undervaluation Tobin’s Q (+) wc03501, wc02649, NOSH, UP 
Growth-resource  
mismatch 
SGrowth (+/–) wc01001 
Liquidity (+/–) wc02001, wc02999 
Leverage (+/–) wc03255, wc03995 
GRDummy (+) wc01001, wc02001, wc02999, wc03255, wc03995 
Industry disturbance IDDummy (+) SIC codes 
Firm size Firm size (–) wc02999 
Free cash flow FCF (+) wc04860, wc04601, wc02999 
Tangible assets Tangibility(+) wc02501, wc02999 
Firm age Firm age  (–) wc18273 
Notes:   
This table presents the constituent DataStream variables used to develop proxies for the hypotheses. The proxies for 
these hypotheses, together with their expected signs, are shown in the second column. ROCE is the ratio of EBITDA 
to total capital employed. AER (average excess returns) is computed as a firm’s average monthly excess return over 
the market (FTSE All Share) return for the year to June. Tobin’s Q is the ratio of market value to book value of assets. 
SGrowth (sales growth) is the percentage of change in total revenue from the previous period. Liquidity is the ratio of 
cash and short-term investments to total assets. Leverage is the firm’s debt to equity ratio. GRDummy takes a value of 
one when there is a mismatch between a firm’s growth opportunities and its resources, and a value of zero otherwise. 
IDDummy (industry disturbance dummy) takes a value of one if a takeover occurs in a firm’s industry, and a value of 
zero otherwise. Firm size is the natural log of a firm’s total assets. FCF is the ratio of free cash flow (operating cash 
flow minus capital investments) to total assets. Tangibility is the ratio of tangible assets (property, plant and 
equipment) to total assets. Firm age is the number of years since incorporation. The hypothesised sign is shown in 
parentheses. Data is obtained from Thomson DataStream and OneBanker databases.  
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Appendix 2 
Additional variables in the augmented model 
Hypothesis Rationale Proxy Reference 
Industry 
Concentration 
Competition in product 
markets (i.e., low 
industry concentration) 
is especially costly for 
inefficiently managed 
firms, as it leads to 
elimination, possibly 
through takeovers. 
Herfindahl-Hirschman 
index; sum of the squared 
market shares (proxied by 
total revenues) of all listed 
firms in the industry. 
Fama and 
Jensen, 1983; 
Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997; 
Powell and 
Yawson, 2005, 
2007. 
Block holders Large shareholders 
facilitate takeovers as 
they can split gains on 
their own shares with 
the bidder.  
Dummy which takes a 
value of one if a firm has a 
significant shareholder 
(i.e., an institutional 
investor holding five 
percent or more of the 
firm’s shares) in the 90 
trading days before June 
of each year, and a value 
of zero otherwise. 
Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1986; 
Cremers et al., 
2009. 
Price 
momentum and 
trading volume 
Short-term price 
momentum and trading 
volume captures active 
trading in takeover 
targets prior to takeover 
bids.  
Price momentum is the t-
statistic of a trend line 
slope fitted to logged daily 
stock prices over the 90 
trading days before June 
of each year. Trading 
volume is the proportion 
of outstanding shares 
traded over the 90 trading 
days to June each year. 
Brar et al., 2009. 
Market 
sentiment 
A firm might have the 
characteristics of a 
target but might not 
receive a bid due to 
poor market conditions 
or economic sentiment.  
Dummy which takes a 
value of one when the 
FTSE ALL share index 
reports a positive return in 
each year to June, and a 
value of zero otherwise. 
Brar et al., 2009. 
Merger 
rumours 
A substantial number of 
takeovers are preceded 
by rumours; these 
rumours explain part of 
the documented pre-bid 
target price run-up. 
Rumour dummy takes a 
value of one if a merger 
bid is preceded by a 
rumour, and a value of 
zero otherwise.  
Jindra and 
Walking, 2004; 
Siganos, 2013; 
Siganos and 
Papa, 2015; 
Pound and 
Zeckhauser, 
1990. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive statistics 
  Full Sample  Targets  Non-targets  Difference 
Variable  Mean  SD   Mean  SD   Mean  SD   p-value 
ROCE 0.118 0.544   0.118 0.544   0.068 0.725   (0.007)*** 
AER -0.018 0.048   -0.018 0.048   -0.012 0.051   (0.000)*** 
Tobin’s Q 1.666 1.266   1.666 1.266   1.860 1.865   (0.000)*** 
Sales growth 0.307 1.300   0.307 1.300   0.330 1.332   (0.513) 
Liquidity 0.122 0.159   0.122 0.159   0.144 0.181   (0.000)*** 
Leverage 0.628 1.710   0.628 1.710   0.512 1.642   (0.005)*** 
GR mismatch 0.247 0.431   0.247 0.431   0.263 0.440   (0.165) 
Disturbance 0.203 0.402   0.203 0.402   0.210 0.408   (0.474) 
Firm size 18.169 1.795   18.169 1.795   17.813 2.192   (0.000)*** 
Free cash flow 0.000 0.161   0.000 0.161   -0.054 0.311   (0.000)*** 
Tangible assets 0.341 0.264   0.341 0.264   0.321 0.250   (0.001)*** 
Firm age 30.465 31.701   30.465 31.701   31.904 32.746   (0.089)* 
Notes:  
This table reports descriptive statistics of predictive variables for the full sample, all targets and all non-targets. ROCE is 
the ratio of EBITDA to total capital employed. AER (average excess returns) is computed as a firm’s average monthly excess 
return over the market (FTSE All Share) return for the year to June. Tobin’s Q is the ratio of market value to book value of 
assets. SGrowth (sales growth) is the percentage of change in total revenue from the previous period. Liquidity is the ratio 
of cash and short-term investments to total assets. Leverage is the firm’s debt to equity ratio. GRDummy takes a value of 
one when there is a mismatch between a firm’s growth opportunities and its resources, and a value of zero otherwise. 
IDDummy (industry disturbance dummy) takes a value of one if a takeover occurs in a firm’s industry and a value of zero 
otherwise. Firm size is the natural log of a firm’s total assets. FCF is the ratio of free cash flow (operating cash flow minus 
capital investments) to total assets. Tangibility is the ratio of tangible assets (property, plant and equipment) to total assets. 
Firm age is the number of years since incorporation. The p-value for the difference in variable means for targets and non-
targets is shown in the last column.  * and *** indicate significance at the 10% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
42 
 
Table 2 
Determinants of firm takeover likelihood 
 Coefficient p-value 
ROCE 0.087 (0.171) 
AER -3.552*** (0.000) 
Tobin’s Q -0.062** (0.011) 
Sales growth 0.002 (0.922) 
Liquidity -0.389* (0.065) 
Leverage 0.025 (0.134) 
GR mismatch 0.018 (0.789) 
Disturbance -0.057 (0.421) 
Firm size 0.020 (0.181) 
Free cash flow 0.973*** (0.000) 
Tangible assets 0.389*** (0.001) 
Firm age -0.004*** (0.000) 
Constant -2.840*** (0.000) 
Observations  18,794  
McFadden's Adj R2 0.011  
Cragg & Uhler's R2 0.017  
LR Chi2 128.558*** (0.000) 
 Notes:  
This table reports the coefficient estimates of the conventional binomial logit model estimated 
using our full data set (1988-2009). For predictions, the model coefficients are re-estimated in a 
recursive manner and used to predict targets one year in advance. The dependent variable in the 
model is takeover probability (bivariate), and the independent variables are the prediction 
hypotheses. ROCE is the ratio of EBITDA to total capital employed. AER (average excess returns) 
is computed as a firm’s average monthly excess return over the market (FTSE All Share) return 
for the year to June. Tobin’s Q is the ratio of market value to book value of assets. SGrowth (sales 
growth) is the percentage of change in total revenue from the previous period. Liquidity is the 
ratio of cash and short-term investments to total assets. Leverage is the firm’s debt to equity ratio. 
GRDummy takes a value of one when there is a mismatch between a firm’s growth opportunities 
and its resources, and a value of zero otherwise. IDDummy (industry disturbance dummy) takes 
a value of one if a takeover occurs in a firm’s industry, and a value of zero otherwise. Firm size is 
the natural log of a firm’s total assets. FCF is the ratio of free cash flow (operating cash flow minus 
capital investments) to total assets. Tangible assets is the ratio of property, plant and equipment 
to total assets. Firm age is the number of years since incorporation. P-values (corrected for 
clustering by firm and year) are presented in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 3 
Risk-adjusted returns 
 
Target 
portfolio 
All  
targets 
Targets in 
target 
portfolio 
All non-
targets 
Non-
targets  in 
target 
portfolio 
Predicted 
non-targets 
(Q1) 
Non-targets 
in Q1 
 
 
Month of 
rumour 
 
Month 
after 
rumour 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
CAPM alpha 0.004 0.012*** 0.015*** -0.000 0.003 -0.005* -0.006* 0.007 -0.007 
 (0.191) (0.000) (0.000) (0.945) (0.352) (0.064) (0.050) (0.505) (0.401) 
FF3F alpha 0.003* 0.012*** 0.014*** -0.001 0.002 -0.005*** -0.008*** 0.003 -0.008 
 (0.099) (0.000) (0.000) (0.476) (0.299) (0.005) (0.000) (0.797) (0.156) 
Market BHAR 0.002** 0.011*** 0.012*** -0.001 0.001 -0.004 -0.004 0.003 0.000 
 (0.048) (0.000) (0.000) (0.232) (0.280) (0.319) (0.310) (0.736) (0.462) 
Size BHAR 0.002 0.013*** 0.013*** -0.001 0.001 -0.004 -0.004 0.000 -0.002 
 (0.116) (0.000) (0.000) (0.162) (0.614) (0.334) (0.315) (0.843) (0.263) 
BTM BHAR 0.002* 0.011*** 0.011*** -0.001 0.001 -0.003 -0.004 0.002 -0.001 
 (0.087) (0.000) (0.000) (0.227) (0.407) (0.347) (0.335) (0.862) (0.372) 
Size & BTM BHAR 0.001 0.012*** 0.012*** -0.001 0.000 -0.003 -0.003 0.000 -0.002 
 (0.187) (0.000) (0.000) (0.144) (0.840) (0.369) (0.340) (0.951) (0.422) 
 
Notes:  
This table presents alphas (intercepts) for cross-sectional regressions of portfolio monthly returns on return-generation factors in the Capital Assets Pricing (CAPM: Sharpe, 1964) and 
Fama & French Three-Factor (FF3F: Fama and French, 1992) models. The models are specified as follows: 
                                          CAPM: (𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹𝑡) = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑚𝑘𝑡(𝑅𝑀𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹𝑡)                            FF3F: (𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹𝑡) = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑚𝑘𝑡(𝑅𝑀𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹𝑡) + 𝛾𝑠𝑚𝑏𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝜏ℎ𝑚𝑙𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  
The dependent variable is (𝑅𝑖𝑡 – 𝑅𝐹𝑡), where 𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the equal-weighted return of the specified portfolio and 𝑅𝐹𝑡 is the risk-free rate. The independent variables in the models include RM 
- RF (excess market return), for the CAPM, and, in addition, SMB (size factor) and HML (book-to-market factor) for the FF3F. UK data for these factors is provided by Gregory et al. 
(2013). The portfolio holding period is 180 months, from July 1996 to June 2011. The estimate of the constant term provides a test of the null hypothesis that the mean monthly excess 
return on the calendar-time portfolio is zero. For the same portfolios, monthly buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) and their bootstrapped skewness-adjusted p-values are also 
computed as specified in Barber and Lyon (1997) and Lyon et al. (1999). We use alternative benchmark portfolios, including Market benchmark, Size benchmark, book-to-market (BTM) 
benchmark and a combination of size and book-to-market (Size & BTM) benchmark to compute BHARs. Model (1) presents results for the full portfolio of predicted targets, (2) presents 
results for a portfolio of all targets in the sample,  (3) presents results obtained by eliminating all non-targets from the target portfolio, (4) presents results for a portfolio of all non-targets 
in the sample, (5) presents results obtained by eliminating all targets from the target portfolio, (6) presents results for a portfolio of predicted non-targets, i.e. the quintile of firms with 
the lowest takeover likelihood (Q1), and (7) presents results obtained by eliminating all the actual targets from Q1. Models (8) and (9) show results obtained for rumour-screened 
portfolios. In (8), returns are calculated from the beginning of the month in which the rumour emerges, while in (9) returns are calculated from the beginning of the month after the 
rumour emerges. P-values are shown in parentheses, and ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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 Table 4 
Suggested strategies and risk-adjusted returns to portfolios of predicted targets (PTs) 
 
Excl. PTs 
which go 
bankrupt 
Excl. PTs 
with Z 
Scores  
Q1 
Excl. PTs 
with Z 
Scores  
Q1, Q2 
Value-
weighted 
returns of 
PTs 
Excl. 
PTs 
with 
MV 
Q1 
Excl. 
PTs with 
MV 
Q1, Q2 
Excl. PTs 
with 
leverage  
Q5 
Excl. PTs 
with 
leverage 
Q4, Q5 
Excl. PTs 
with 
liquidity 
Q1 
Excl. PTs 
with 
liquidity  
Q1, Q2 
Strategies 
(6), (8) & 
(10) 
combined 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
CAPM alpha 0.006** 0.005* 0.006* -0.001** 0.004 0.005 0.005** 0.007** 0.005 0.006* 0.009** 
 (0.024) (0.091) (0.052) (0.013) (0.264) (0.105) (0.049) (0.013) (0.103) (0.053) (0.021) 
FF3F alpha 0.005*** 0.004** 0.005*** -0.001*** 0.002 0.004** 0.005*** 0.007*** 0.004** 0.005** 0.008*** 
 (0.001) (0.024) (0.009) (0.009) (0.212) (0.044) (0.009) (0.001) (0.031) (0.012) (0.007) 
Market BHAR 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.001*** 0.002* 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.004** 0.003*** 0.005*** 0.009*** 
 (0.008) (0.000) (0.001) (0.006) (0.080) (0.000) (0.006) (0.010) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) 
Size BHAR 0.003** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.001** 0.001 0.003*** 0.003** 0.004** 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.007*** 
 (0.043) (0.000) (0.002) (0.021) (0.263) (0.007) (0.011) (0.012) (0.009) (0.004) (0.006) 
BTM BHAR 0.004** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.001*** 0.002 0.004*** 0.003** 0.004** 0.003*** 0.005*** 0.008*** 
 (0.014) (0.001) (0.007) (0.004) (0.133) (0.000) (0.013) (0.019) (0.005) (0.001) (0.003) 
Size & BTM  0.002 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001** 0.001 0.002** 0.003** 0.004** 0.002** 0.004*** 0.007*** 
BHAR (0.163) (0.005) (0.006) (0.046) (0.598) (0.032) (0.011) (0.012) (0.020) (0.007) (0.009) 
 
Notes: 
This table presents alphas (intercepts) for cross-sectional regressions of portfolio monthly returns on return-generation factors in the Capital Assets Pricing (CAPM: Sharpe, 1964) and 
Fama & French Three-Factor (FF3F: Fama and French, 1992) models. The models are specified as follows: 
                                          CAPM: (𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹𝑡) = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑚𝑘𝑡(𝑅𝑀𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹𝑡)                            FF3F: (𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹𝑡) = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑚𝑘𝑡(𝑅𝑀𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹𝑡) + 𝛾𝑠𝑚𝑏𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝜏ℎ𝑚𝑙𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  
The dependent variable is (𝑅𝑖𝑡 – 𝑅𝐹𝑡), where 𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the equal-weighted return of the specified portfolio and 𝑅𝐹𝑡 is the risk-free rate. The independent variables in the models include RM 
- RF (excess market return), for the CAPM, and, in addition, SMB (size factor) and HML (book-to-market factor) for the FF3F. UK data for these factors is provided by Gregory et al. 
(2013). The portfolio holding period is 180 months, from July 1996 to June 2011. The estimate of the constant term provides a test of the null hypothesis that the mean monthly excess 
return on the calendar-time portfolio is zero. For the same portfolios, monthly buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) and their bootstrapped skewness-adjusted p-values are also 
computed as specified in Barber and Lyon (1997) and Lyon et al. (1999). We use alternative benchmark portfolios, including Market benchmark, Size benchmark, book-to-market (BTM) 
benchmark and a combination of size and book-to-market (Size & BTM) benchmark to compute BHARs. Model (1) shows the returns to target portfolios when all actual bankrupt firms 
are excluded from target portfolios (TPs). Models (2) and (3) show results when firms with Taffler Z scores in the first, then first and second, quintile(s), respectively (i.e., low Taffler Z 
scores), are excluded from TPs. Model (4) shows results when predicted targets are value-weighted when forming TPs. Models (5) and (6) show results when firms with market 
capitalisation in the first, then first and second, quintile(s), respectively, are excluded from TPs. Models (7) and (8) show results when firms with leverage in the fifth, then fourth and 
fifth, quintile(s), respectively, are excluded. Models (9) and (10) show results when firms with liquidity in the first, then first and second, quintile(s), respectively, are excluded. In Model 
(11), we exclude firms with size quintiles 1 and 2, liquidity quintiles 1 and 2, and leverage quintiles 4 and 5. P-values are shown in parentheses, and ***, ** and * indicate significance at 
1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
45 
 
Table 5 
Suggested strategies and risk-adjusted returns to portfolios of predicted targets (PTs) – Augmented model 
 
Target 
portfolio 
 
Excl. PTs 
which go 
bankrupt 
Excl. PTs 
with Z 
Scores  
Q1, Q2 
Value-weighted 
stock returns of 
PTs 
Excl. PTs 
with MV 
Q1, Q2 
Excl. PTs 
with leverage 
Q4, Q5 
Excl. PTs 
with liquidity  
Q1, Q2 
Strategies 
(5), (6) & (7) 
combined 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
CAPM alpha 0.002 0.004 0.004 -0.003*** 0.004*** 0.005* 0.005 0.008** 
 (0.567) (0.126) (0.195) (0.000) (0.000) (0.084) (0.144) (0.042) 
FF3F alpha 0.001 0.003** 0.003 -0.003*** 0.002 0.004** 0.004* 0.007** 
 (0.686) (0.041) (0.111) (0.000) (0.228) (0.028) (0.070) (0.017) 
Market BHAR -0.000 0.004*** 0.002** 0.000 0.003** 0.002 0.003** 0.007** 
 (0.873) (0.000) (0.035) (0.888) (0.012) (0.205) (0.023) (0.011) 
Size BHAR -0.000 0.004*** 0.001** 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.002* 0.005** 
 (0.669) (0.000) (0.037) (0.803) (0.201) (0.177) (0.068) (0.038) 
BTM BHAR -0.000 0.004*** 0.001 0.000 0.003** 0.002 0.003** 0.006** 
 (0.725) (0.000) (0.103) (0.837) (0.017) (0.284) (0.022) (0.024) 
Size & BTM -0.000 0.003*** 0.001* 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.002* 0.005** 
BHAR (0.764) (0.000) (0.055) (0.934) (0.239) (0.115) (0.087) (0.039) 
 
Notes:  
This table presents alphas (intercepts) for cross-sectional regressions of portfolio monthly returns on return-generation factors in the Capital Assets Pricing (CAPM: Sharpe, 1964) and 
Fama & French Three-Factor (FF3F: Fama and French, 1992) models. The models are specified as follows: 
                                          CAPM: (𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹𝑡) = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑚𝑘𝑡(𝑅𝑀𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹𝑡)                            FF3F: (𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹𝑡) = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑚𝑘𝑡(𝑅𝑀𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹𝑡) + 𝛾𝑠𝑚𝑏𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝜏ℎ𝑚𝑙𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  
The dependent variable is (𝑅𝑖𝑡 – 𝑅𝐹𝑡), where 𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the equal-weighted return of the specified portfolio and 𝑅𝐹𝑡 is the risk-free rate. The independent variables in the models include RM 
- RF (excess market return), for the CAPM, and, in addition, SMB (size factor) and HML (book-to-market factor) for the FF3F. UK data for these factors is provided by Gregory et al. 
(2013). The portfolio holding period is 180 months, from July 1996 to June 2011. The estimate of the constant term provides a test of the null hypothesis that the mean monthly excess 
return on the calendar-time portfolio is zero. For the same portfolios, monthly buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) and their bootstrapped skewness-adjusted p-values are also 
computed as specified in Barber and Lyon (1997) and Lyon et al. (1999). We use alternative benchmark portfolios, including Market benchmark, Size benchmark, book-to-market (BTM) 
benchmark and a combination of size and book-to-market (Size & BTM) benchmark to compute BHARs. Model (1) presents results obtained for the augmented model. Model (2) shows 
the returns to the target portfolios when all actual bankrupt firms are excluded from target portfolios (TPs). Model (3) shows results when firms with Taffler Z scores in the first and 
second quintiles (i.e., low Taffler Z scores) are excluded from TPs. Model (4) shows results when predicted targets are value-weighted when forming TPs. Model (5) shows results when 
firms with market capitalisation in the first and second quintiles are excluded from TPs. Model (6) shows results when firms with leverage in the fourth and fifth quintiles are excluded. 
Model (7) shows results when firms with liquidity in the first, then first and second, quintile(s), respectively, are excluded. In Model (8), we exclude firms with size quintiles 1 and 2, 
liquidity quintiles 1 and 2, and leverage quintiles 4 and 5. P-values are shown in parentheses, and ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 6 
Additional analysis: Risk-adjusted returns to alternative strategies 
 
Industry-adjusted 
Model  
Multinomial Model 
(Cash)  
Hedge 
strategy 
 
Target 
portfolio 
Screened 
portfolio  
Target 
portfolio 
Screened 
portfolio  
Screened 
portfolio 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) 
CAPM alpha 0.001 0.003  0.003 0.008**  0.009** 
 (0.604) (0.339)  (0.260) (0.044)  (0.019) 
FF3F alpha 0.000 0.002  0.002 0.006**  0.009** 
 (0.915) (0.403)  (0.202) (0.018)  (0.020) 
Market BHAR -0.000 0.002  0.001 0.007***  0.014*** 
 (0.829) (0.285)  (0.287) (0.002)  (0.000) 
Size BHAR -0.001 0.001  0.001 0.006***  0.010*** 
 (0.254) (0.668)  (0.317) (0.009)  (0.000) 
BTM BHAR -0.000 0.002  0.001 0.007***  0.013*** 
 (0.611) (0.327)  (0.452) (0.006)  (0.000) 
Size & BTM BHAR -0.002* 0.001  0.001 0.005**  0.010*** 
 (0.061) (0.611)  (0.241) (0.027)  (0.000) 
 
Notes:  
This table presents alphas (intercepts) for cross-sectional regressions of portfolio monthly returns on return-generation 
factors in the Capital Assets Pricing (CAPM: Sharpe, 1964) and Fama & French Three-Factor (FF3F: Fama and French, 
1992) models. The models are specified as follows; 
 CAPM: (𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹𝑡) = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑚𝑘𝑡(𝑅𝑀𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹𝑡)  
 FF3F: (𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹𝑡) = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑚𝑘𝑡(𝑅𝑀𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹𝑡) + 𝛾𝑠𝑚𝑏𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝜏ℎ𝑚𝑙𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  
The dependent variable is (𝑅𝑖𝑡 – 𝑅𝐹𝑡), where 𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the equal-weighted return of the specified portfolio and 𝑅𝐹𝑡 is the 
risk-free rate. The independent variables in the models include RM - RF (excess market return), for the CAPM, and, in 
addition, SMB (size factor) and HML (book-to-market factor) for the FF3F. UK data for these factors is provided by 
Gregory et al. (2013). The portfolio holding period is 180 months, from July 1996 to June 2011. The estimate of the 
constant term provides a test of the null hypothesis that the mean monthly excess return on the calendar-time portfolio 
is zero. For the same portfolios, monthly buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) and their bootstrapped skewness-
adjusted p-values are also computed as specified in Barber and Lyon (1997) and Lyon et al. (1999). We use alternative 
benchmark portfolios, including Market benchmark, Size benchmark, book-to-market (BTM) benchmark and a 
combination of size and book-to-market (Size & BTM) benchmark to compute BHARs. Model (1) shows the returns to 
corresponding target portfolios when all variables in the conventional model (except dummy variables) are scaled by 
their 4-digit SIC code industry average. Model (2) shows returns to target portfolios (Model 1) screened for size, 
leverage and liquidity. The screening involves eliminating all firms with market values in the first and second quintiles, 
leverage in the fourth and fifth quintiles and liquidity in the first and second quintiles. Model (3) shows the returns to 
corresponding target portfolios derived by using a multinomial model which predicts targets by method of payment. 
The target portfolio in this case constitutes the 20 percent of firms with the highest likelihood of receiving a cash bid 
in each year. Model (4) show returns to Model (3) when the portfolios are further screened for size, leverage and 
liquidity, as discussed above. Model (5) presents results for the conventional model when a hedge strategy is applied 
to screened portfolios. This hedge strategy involves screening the target portfolios by size, liquidity and leverage, as 
above, then short-selling firms with low market values (Q1 and Q2), high leverage (Q4 and Q5) and low liquidity (Q1 
and Q2). P-values are shown in parentheses, and ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
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Figure 1 
Proportion of targets and bankrupt firms in predicted target 
portfolios 
 
Notes:  
This figure summarises the performance of the prediction model in out-of-sample analyses between 1995 and 2009. 
Concentration refers to the proportion of non-targets, bankrupt and target firms within portfolios of predicted targets. 
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Figure 2 
Bid announcement dates and stock returns 
 
Panel A: The distribution of target bid announcement dates 
 
Panel B: Cumulative market-adjusted returns to targets around bid announcements 
 
Notes:  
This figure shows the timing and stock market reaction to takeover bids. The analysis is based on all takeover targets 
in the sample with available data. Panel A shows the distribution of bid announcement months from July to June. 
Panel B presents cumulative abnormal monthly returns earned during the period starting twelve months prior to 
(month -12) and ending twelve months after (Month 12) the bid announcement month (month 0). The analysis employs 
event study methodology to compute the market-adjusted monthly returns to targets around the announcement 
period.  
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Figure 3 
Cumulative abnormal returns and takeover likelihood 
  
Notes:  
This figure shows the cumulative abnormal returns to targets in Quintile 1 (predicted non-targets) and Quintile 5 
(predicted targets) around the merger announcement day. Returns are tracked for the month (or 20 trading days) 
leading up to the bid. Quintile 1 (Quintile 5) represents the 20 percent of firms with the lowest (highest) takeover 
probability. Daily abnormal returns are computed as the difference between stock returns and market returns during 
a particular day. These returns are then averaged across the firms in the portfolio to obtain the portfolio’s abnormal 
returns.  
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Figure 4 
Cumulative abnormal returns and merger rumours  
 
Notes:  
This figure shows the cumulative abnormal returns (1) around rumours, for all rumoured targets in target portfolios; 
(2) around rumours, for all rumoured targets in the target portfolio that eventually receive a takeover bid; and (3) 
around merger bids, for all rumoured targets in target portfolios. That is, (2) and (3) plot the rumour returns and 
eventual bid announcement returns, respectively, for bids which are preceded by merger rumours. The target 
portfolios represent the 20 percent of firms with the highest takeover probability. Returns are tracked for the month 
(or 20 trading days) leading up to, and the month after, the rumour emergence or bid announcement day (day 0). Daily 
abnormal returns are computed as the difference between stock returns and market returns during a particular day. 
These returns are then averaged across the portfolio to obtain the portfolio’s abnormal returns.  
 
3
0
%
2
0
%
1
0
%
0C
u
m
u
la
tiv
e
 d
a
ily
 a
b
n
o
rm
a
l 
re
tu
rn
s
-20 -10 0 10 20
Days around the event
Rumour returns to all rumours in target portfolio (1)
Rumour returns to rumours that lead to a bid (2)
Eventual bid returns to rumoured targets (3)
